The Firearms Examination Unit (FEU) at the D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences (DFS) should immediately cease casework and a comprehensive evaluation of the competence of all current examiners should be performed, according to an audit conducted by the District of Columbia Office of the Attorney General (OAG). The results were revealed in court documents obtained by WTOP.
The audit team says they do not have confidence in the analytical results of the FEU, and suggests that clients and stakeholders not rely on results from the embattled laboratory. Additionally, the documents say the findings illustrate “very serious…problems associated with DFS management.”
The audit of DFS, specifically the firearms unit, began in January 2020 at the request of the D.C. Office of the Inspector General. In October 2019, the Justice Department asked the laboratory to turn over documents and communications dealing with firearm evidence examination policies as well as any reviews or indications of errors. The request called for material dating to 2015. Analysis of these documents led the inspector general’s office to initiate a criminal investigation.
The controversy ties back to two homicides in August and November 2015. Firearms analysts at DFS determined cartridge casings recovered from the August homicide matched cartridge casings recovered from the November homicide. The case moved forward after jurors agreed to indict both suspects— Rondell McLeoud and Joseph Brown—for the shootings.
However, when prosecutors hired outside analysts to retest the shell casings before the trial was to begin, the analysts determined the casings were not fired from the same gun. Once prosecutors informed the lab of the potential error, retesting was performed—and this is where the problems began.
FEU Ballistics Supervisor Jonathan Fried and another analyst retested the casings and reached a conclusion of elimination, agreeing with the outside analysts who cast doubt on the initial results. In the court documents, Fried says he presented the new elimination results to superiors Wayne Arendse and Jonathan Pope, but they expressed concerns that the conclusion would show DFS made a mistake. The evidence was subsequently presented to two other analysts, who reached a conclusion of identification. However, Fried says there was insufficient time for the analysts to conduct a full examination.
Ultimately, the Arendse and Pope submitted the official report with a conclusion of “inconclusive” due to the conflicting findings of various analysts. These results were also communicated to the SAB and ANAB on May 6, 2020.
Pope then asked Fried to do a reexamination, to which Fried suggested an outside examiner as he felt he was inherently biased. Fried’s request was denied, with Pope claiming the reexamination order came directly from DFS Director Jenifer Smith, which was untrue.
“On May 12, 2020, [Fried] began his official examination of the evidence. He stated…if he could do it over again, he would have resigned rather than conduct the reexamination. Though never directly told to reach a finding of inconclusive, Fried believes he was manipulated by management into conducting an examination when he had a bias. The disparate findings of the other examiners cause him to question his initial conclusion of elimination,” reads the court document.
Based on this information, as well as the technical performance of other analysts in this case and others, the audit team concluded that all current examiners need to be evaluated before any more casework is performed. Evaluation will be followed by training and testing to see if the analysts are competent to undertake evidence once again. Evaluations will be performed by an outside agency, as the auditors have determined DFS does not have the qualifications to perform these activities.
According to the court document, the audit team came down particularly hard on the DFS management team.
“DFS management not only failed to properly address the conflicting results…, but also engaged in actions to alter the results reached by the examiners assigned to conduct a reexamination of the evidence. DFS management then misrepresented the various activities undertaken and analytical conclusions reached to their clients and stakeholders. Such actions indicate a lack of adherence to core principles of integrity, ethics and professional responsibilities. Management has cast doubt on the reliability of the work product of the entire DFS laboratory,” the document concludes.
The once-heralded lab is no stranger to audits and controversy—or erroneous results, for that matter. The $220 million facility was built in 2012 to much ado, including praise that it would help quickly process evidence all around D.C. But by early 2015, two audits found that the lab’s DNA procedures were inadequate, jeopardizing nearly 200 cases. At the time, D.C. district prosecutors within the U.S. attorney’s office alerted city officials to what they described as numerous errors with DNA analysis performed at the lab.
The director of the lab, Max Houck, resigned shortly after the audits, and two other senior officials, the chief scientist and the senior manager for DNA testing were all let go. Smith then took over the agency. In a 2018 press conference, Smith said she eliminated old policies and practices when she took over.
Photo: Inside the District of Columbia Department of Forensic Sciences crime lab. Credit: DC.gov
Editor’s note: An earlier version of this story incorrectly said the D.C. Department of Forensic Science temporarily lost accreditation to perform DNA testing in 2015. The lab did not lose accreditation, but a national accreditation board audit found “insufficient and inadequate” practices at the lab, and it was ordered to temporarily suspend DNA casework.